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The Nature of Arbitral Authority: A Comment on Lesotho Highlands William W. Park * I. Drawing Lines For pure intellectual challenge, few endeavors match the task of setting principled standards to distinguish an arbitrator's good faith mistakes from an excess of authority. In bargaining for out-of-court dispute resolution, parties to arbitration agreements commit themselves to respect the result regardless of who wins. The award is intended to be final even if one side thinks that the arbitrator got it wrong.
Arbitration is a consensual process, however, unfolding within an enclosure created by the contract and applicable arbitration law. The litigants accept the risk of arbitrator mistake only for decisions falling within the borders of arbitral authority.
Great practical importance attaches to how lines are drawn between arbitrator mistake and excess of authority. Indeed, the distinction that goes to the heart of what arbitration is all about. A simple error is normally not subject to appeal, since the litigants have asked an arbitrator, not a judge, to decide the legal and factual merits of their disputes. By contrast, no court should recognize an award falling beyond the arbitrator's authority. Thus some measure of judicial scrutiny over arbitral jurisdiction remains a vital safeguard to the integrity of the process, and constitutes an essential corollary to enforcement of legitimate awards.
II. The Lesotho Highlands Decision
A. Error of Law or Excess of Powers?
The House of Lords decision in Lesotho Highlands v. Impreglio 1 serves as a prism * Professor of Law, Boston University.
2 through which to separate several of the themes that inhere in the nature of arbitral authority. In rejecting arguments that an error about the currency of an award represented an excess of jurisdiction, their Lordships confirmed a healthy appreciation that arbitrators do not exceed their powers simply by making a mistake.
Construction of a dam in the African nation of Lesotho gave rise to a dispute between the builder and the owner. The dispute was submitted to arbitration by a three member tribunal sitting in London. The builder claimed amounts which, had they been paid when due, would have been payable largely in Lesotho Maloti.
By the time of the award, however, the project was finished, and the contractors had no need of Maloti. The arbitrators, therefore, denominated the award entirely in four hard European currencies that the contract had indicated for non-Maloti payments, using the historic exchange rates provided in the contract. 2 Since the Maloti had collapsed between the contract payment date and the award, the owner suffered the downward slide of the Maloti.
Understandably disappointed, the owner challenged the award. A frontal attack, however, was not possible. As permitted under the 1996 Arbitration Act, 3 the parties had excluded appeal on questions of law by electing to arbitrate under the rules of the International The Arbitration Act, however, also permits awards to be set aside for "serious irregularity", defined to include "the tribunal exceeding its powers". 5 The owner argued that the arbitrators went beyond their powers by the way they fixed the award in European currencies.
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Article 48 of the Arbitration Act permits arbitrators to "order the payment of a sum of money in any currency." The owner argued that the hard currency award was an improper exercise of this power, and misapplied the contract and applicable law. According to this view, the Arbitration Act simply clarified that awards need not be made in Sterling.
Their Lordships decided that the award's choice of currency did not constitute an excess of powers. In so doing, they looked to the radical nature of recent changes in English arbitration law, evidencing an intent to restrict judicial intervention in the arbitral process. The result was an affirmation that a mere error of law will not amount to an excess of power. That a mistake in contract interpretation should not be reviewable seems uncontroversial.
The arbitrators' job is to interpret the parties' agreement.
The possibility of a mistake interpreting the Arbitration Act, however, might be more A party disappointed by an award will sometimes attempt a "backdoor" appeal, through arguments which depict the arbitrator's mistake as an excess of authority rather than a contract misinterpretation. Errors of law in contract interpretation seem to lend themselves to being portrayed as excess of jurisdiction. An award allowing lost profits, for example, might be portrayed as an arrogation of power not granted by the contract.
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Sound distinctions between simple mistake and excess of authority rest on two fundamental principles. First, an agreement to arbitrate normally means accepting that the arbitrator might make a mistake in evaluating the merits of the parties' claims and defenses. It would make little sense to say that an award will be binding if litigants automatically get a second bite at the apple, turning arbitration into foreplay to court proceedings.
Equally important, however, is the principle that litigants in arbitral proceedings do not expect to be bound by overreaching intermeddlers. Decisions on matters never submitted to 16 Some arbitral regimes permit annulment for excess of authority only when a tribunal "manifestly" goes beyond its powers. See Article 53 (1) The world of legal education might provide an illustration of the distinction between a simple mistake and a jurisdictional error. In American law faculties, the professor who teaches a course normally bears responsibility for assigning grades. If the professor gives one of her students a "B" then, that is the grade. It matters little that a colleague who teaches in that field might find the grade severe, and evaluate the exam as "A" quality. The faculty has granted each teacher authority to grade his or her exams.
The language of jurisdictional challenges can create a risk of loading the analytic dice by using the term "arbitrator" to refer to an individual who might never have received a mandate from the parties. Yet labeling someone an arbitrator does not in itself confer authority to decide disputes, any more than calling a tail a leg adds to the limbs of Abraham Lincoln's proverbial dog. 19 A document styled "Award" might rest on an alleged arbitration clause that was forged or signed by someone without authority, or which explicitly covers a different dispute. In this context, to speak of "award" enforcement presumes that the author of the document was authorized to decide the dispute, which is precisely the matter in controversy.
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19 Abraham Lincoln is said to have asked, "If I call a tail a leg, how many legs does a dog have?" He then answered, "Five? No, four. Calling a tail a leg does not make it so." 20 This linguistic problem is easier to see when a controversy surrounds the existence of the arbitration clause than when it concern's the clause's scope. Most observers have no difficulty in seeing that an individual who hears a claim for loan repayment is not an arbitrator if the purported arbitration clause was forged. However, when questions arise about the scope rather than existence of the clause, the analysis becomes trickier. Imagine that First Bank and Second Bank enter into a narrowly drafted agreement to arbitrate a letter of credit dispute. Later another difference between the two institutions arose, which First Bank prefers to submit to a court rather than an arbitrator. If Second Bank succeeds in convincing an arbitral institution to entertain the claim, the resulting "award" would represent nothing of the kind.
B. Party Expectations vs. Voodoo Jurisprudence
Arbitrators might exceed their authority in least three different ways. First, they might join a non-signatory 21 that never agreed to arbitrate. 22 Second, they might fail to respect the scope of their arbitral mission by making an award on matters never submitted to arbitration, or by intentionally disregarding the clear procedural mandates on how the case was to be decided.
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Finally, an arbitral tribunal might go beyond its jurisdiction through decisions not permitted by mandatory arbitration law, whether as to subject matter (e.g., employment disputes) or remedies (e.g., punitive damages).
In many of these instances, defining jurisdictional excess often bring to mind a "we know it when we see it" approach. 24 While this provides a convenient starting point, the absence of intellectual rigor will not make it satisfying for very long. Most thoughtful people accept the 21 In some cases arbitration agreements may be concluded by reference to an unsigned document. Nevertheless, the term "nonsignatories" remains useful shorthand to designate those persons whose relationship to the arbitration may at first blush be unclear, and who cannot easily be called "non-parties" given that their status as "party" is exactly what is asserted, often through theories such as agency. Normally, the allocation of functions between judges and arbitrators explains itself by reference to contract principles. 27 Agreements to arbitrate are enforced to protect expectations.
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When business managers agree to settle differences by arbitration, judicial deference to the arbitral process commends itself by virtue of the same policies that justify enforcement of contracts in general: giving effect to the parties' legitimate choices.
On occasion, jurisdictional tools can be misused, clouding sound analysis. The wellknown principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz permits arbitrators to determine their own jurisdiction as an initial matter. 29 Sometimes, however, this principle has been misapplied to suggest that courts need not investigate the parties' real intentions on the existence or scope of arbitral authority. 30 The temptation to such voodoo jurisprudence, which expects verbal formulae to change rights independent of context, 31 must be resisted. Agreements to arbitrate are made by 27 Regulatory impulses also come into play, at least at the margins, when courts hesitate to enforce private decision-making that runs afoul of public policy, either by virtue of touching subjects too sensitive to be removed from courts (e.g., claims of discrimination) or because the decision-making process is tainted with bias or corruption. 28 In the United States, so-called "court-annexed arbitration" rests on a different footing, since the parties retain a right to de novo trial. See 28 U.S.C. § 655 (1994). It is also misleading to apply the term "arbitration" to state delegation of minor claims to organizations such as the American Arbitration Association. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 65B.525 (requiring arbitration of motor vehicle accident claims not in excess of $10,000 entities and individuals, not pieces of paper.
C. Ripeness and Staleness
On occasion, arbitral jurisdiction is contrasted with notions of admissibility, a term used to describe constraints on the right to file claims in cases clearly subject to arbitration. Since the matter is properly before the arbitrators, their decisions would usually not be reviewable in court. 32 Admissibility might relate to whether a claim is ripe enough (or too stale) for adjudication, or to arbitral preconditions (such as mediation) or time bars (a prohibition on claims more than six years after the alleged wrong).
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In some instances, jurisdictional and admissibility questions may overlap. For example, a brokerage contract might be subject to rules that make an investor's claim ineligible for arbitration unless filed within six years after the allegedly inappropriate advice or trade.
Although there is no grumbling as the stock rises, when the market goes sour years later the investor complains his savings were lost due to an improper purchase. 34 Sometimes the parties' in New York. Here the contest was not about who had agreed to arbitrate, but rather the scope of an arbitration clause that had clearly been signed by both sides. 32 There might, however, be some situations in which valid jurisdictional challenges could be mounted to improper decisions on admissibility. One questionable aspect of this decision is that the Swiss court apparently deemed its review powers greater on questions of law than of fact, perhaps analogizing to review of cantonal court decisions. As a policy matter, this distinction is highly problematic. If arbitrators wrongly assume Company A acted as agent for Company B in signing an arbitration clause, they exceed their authority as to Company B whether from misunderstanding the law of agency or from a factual mistake about who signed the contract.
IV. The End of Litigation or the Beginning?
Defining jurisdictional excess in arbitration implicates a tension between the principle that awards should be final on the merits and the equally important rule that arbitration is
consensual. An unhappy loser in a fair proceeding should not be permitted to renege on the bargain to arbitrate. However, no one should be denied access to courts absent a clear agreement on the matter.
Applying these principles in practice can call for the dexterity of an intellectual high-wire artist, who must avoid leaning too much to one side or another in balancing finality against procedural integrity. The decision in Lesotho Highlands furthers proper equilibrium, affirming that English courts do not re-decide matters the parties entrusted to arbitrators. If the award is within the submission, and contains the honest decision of the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of equity will not set it aside for error, either in law or fact. A contrary course would be a substitution of the judgment of the chancellor [the judiciary] in place of the judges chosen by the parties [the arbitrators], and would make an award the commencement, not the end, of litigation.
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Intelligent application of this approach remains vital to health of commercial arbitration.
39 Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344 (1855) . 40 Id at 349.
